Section 1
The ask, and what is already in place
The ask in one sentence
That the Government of Grenada and the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) jointly adopt a five-part package, fair export value, interconnection by default, a resilience-grade national standard, roof-level finance, and an accredited installer workforce, so that distributed solar becomes the normal way Grenadians generate electricity on their own roofs within five years, and so that Carriacou and Petite Martinique reach their committed 100 percent renewable electricity supply on the back of systems built to survive the next storm.
Grenada does not need to be persuaded that diesel dependence is a problem. It pays for that dependence every month, in a fuel charge that moves with world oil prices, on a grid where 98.3 percent of generation in 2024 was non-renewable.[1] Nor does Grenada lack ambition: its third Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0, October 2025) commits the country to cutting greenhouse gas emissions 40 percent below 2010 levels by 2030, maintained or deepened to 2035, and commits Carriacou and Petite Martinique to 100 percent renewable electricity.[2] What Grenada lacks is not intent or institutions. It lacks the connective rules that turn a good solar resource and a willing public into installed, exporting, insured rooftop systems. That is what this program supplies.
Unlike the Canadian program this design is modelled on, Grenada does not need a campaign to create its foundations. Much of the hard institutional work is already done, and some of it was paid for at painful cost. The program proposed here is deliberately built on what exists:
Already in place
The argument of this paper is therefore narrow and practical. The institutions exist. The resource is excellent. The pipeline of utility projects is real. What is missing is the distributed layer: the rules, prices, and financing that let a homeowner in St George’s, a hotel in Grand Anse, a fisheries cooperative in Grenville or a nutmeg processor in St Andrew put panels on a roof, export surplus power at a fair price, and know the system will still be standing, and still be paid for its exports, after the next hurricane season. Sections 2 to 8 set out why that layer has not formed, what comparable countries did about it, and the five pillars that would form it in Grenada.
Section 2
Diagnosis: world-class sun, stalled roofs
Grenada’s solar resource exceeds 5 kWh per square metre per day, and the one local project with published yield figures, Limlair on Carriacou, was projected to deliver about 1,828 kWh per kWp per year.[11][12] Yet after two decades of policy statements, installed solar capacity at the end of 2024 was somewhere between roughly 4 MW and 6.4 MW, depending on the source and the definition used, on a system with a peak demand of 37.67 MW.[13] Solar generated 1.62 percent of Grenada’s electricity in 2024.[1] The gap between resource and result is not a technology problem. It is the accumulated product of eight documented barriers.
Barrier 1: Exports were paid for fuel only
The single most consequential number in Grenadian solar history is EC$0.45 per kWh. That is roughly what a customer exporting renewable electricity to the grid was paid under Grenlec’s historical buy-back arrangements, a fuel-cost-only value, at a time when the retail price of electricity was about EC$1.08 per kWh.[14] A household was asked to sell its surplus at less than half the price it paid to buy power back, with the network, capacity, and avoided-loss value of its generation priced at zero. No current PURC-published avoided-cost figure was located in the research for this paper, and no published net-billing export tariff in force was found: the World Bank’s CEGEB project, approved in February 2025, still lists developing net-billing guidelines as future work.[8] Until an export price exists that a bank, or a household doing arithmetic at a kitchen table, can rely on, distributed solar will remain a hobby for the committed rather than an investment for the many.
Barrier 2: Self-generation is capped below the roof
Under the Self-Generator Program as described in NDC 3.0, residential systems are capped at 120 percent of nominal daily electricity demand and commercial systems at just 60 percent.[2] The commercial cap is the binding one: a hotel, warehouse or agro-processing plant with a large, sunlit roof and high daytime cooling load cannot size a system to its roof or its daytime demand, cannot export the midday surplus its roof could produce, and so cannot reach the scale at which installation economics work. NDC 3.0 notes the framework is under review. This program proposes what that review should conclude (Pillar 1 and Pillar 2).
Barrier 3: Procurement by tranche
Grenada’s history is of rationed access in small slices. Grenlec’s voluntary Customer Interconnection Programme offered 500 to 800 kW at a time, for systems up to 100 kW, first come, first served.[15] PURC’s SSIPP pilot, launched in 2021, licensed roughly 850 kW in total across eight or nine small IPPs by the mid-2020s; PURC’s own chief executive acknowledged the program “took quite a while because we had to develop a rigorous regulatory framework.”[16] Each tranche required its own process, its own negotiation, its own wait. Nothing in that structure lets a market form: installers cannot invest against a pipeline that arrives 850 kW at a time, and households cannot plan around windows that open and close.
Barrier 4: The rules are unfinished, and unpublished where it matters
The Supply Code that will govern interconnection was still labelled Draft on PURC’s website in 2026.[5] Grenlec submitted an Interim Tariff Methodology to PURC in 2022 and was still awaiting feedback in its 2022 reporting; the legacy fuel and non-fuel tariff structure remains in use.[17] No published feeder-level hosting-capacity study or map was located: a prospective generator cannot discover, before spending money on design, how much capacity its local feeder can absorb. Uncertainty of this kind is not neutral. It prices itself into every quote as delay, redesign, and risk premium.
Barrier 5: Upfront cost, on an island where the alternative is a monthly bill
The economics of Grenadian solar are, on paper, superb: every kilowatt-hour self-consumed displaces electricity bought at roughly EC$0.97 to EC$1.02 per kWh. But the system must be paid for upfront, in a market where the World Bank diagnoses the regional obstacles as “small project sizes, underprepared grids, fragmented regulations, weak institutional capacity, and high vulnerability,” the stated rationale for its US$110 million Regional Renewable Energy and Infrastructure Investment Facility (RREIIF).[18] Grenlec’s own filings show fuel over- and under-recovery swings of EC$16 million within a single year, balance-sheet volatility that makes the utility a risky counterparty for small generators without credit support.[17] Households and small businesses face the same wall from the other side: no established revolving fund, no on-bill repayment mechanism, and (Barrier 7) insurance costs that storm risk inflates.
Barrier 6: The legacy of the monopoly years
The stall has deep roots. During the WRB era, Grenlec’s “restrictive and punitive policies discouraged the adoption of solar panels,” and Grenada missed its goal of 20 percent renewable electricity by 2020 by a wide margin; market entry by independent producers failed against a monopoly contract structure that ran to 2073.[19][20] The 2016 reforms that broke that structure triggered the ICSID arbitration whose settlement cost the state US$63 million, and Grenlec itself records that regulatory and commercial uncertainty through that period stalled its own solar and customer-generation plans.[3][21] Roughly five years, and a generation of installer businesses that never formed, were the price. The buyback resolved the ownership question; it did not by itself rebuild the market the monopoly years prevented.
Barrier 7: Hurricane risk is priced into every panel
Hurricane Beryl made landfall on Carriacou as a Category 4 storm on 1 July 2024. Total effects were assessed at EC$595.16 million, 16.74 percent of 2023 GDP; energy-sector damage was US$4.77 million with a further US$2.56 million in losses; every customer on Carriacou and Petite Martinique lost power, and full restoration took until the end of October 2024.[22][23] The Limlair solar plant on Carriacou, due to complete the month Beryl struck, was severely damaged despite being engineered to a 168 mph design wind speed.[12] No source was found pricing property or all-risk insurance for private rooftop solar in Grenada: the documented insurance market is at utility level, through CCRIF’s parametric product. A rational homeowner therefore faces an uninsurable, or expensively insurable, asset on the roof of the house the storm is also threatening. Any serious program must treat storm risk as a design and finance problem, not an afterthought (Pillar 3).
Barrier 8: A thin installer base, and no pipeline to thicken it
Grenada’s entire energy sector employed 346 people in 2019.[24] T.A. Marryshow Community College (TAMCC) offers electrical installation and electronics programs, but no dedicated solar PV qualification was found in its listed programs; the one regional record of a Grenadian solar training cohort, a Caribbean Vocational Qualification (CVQ) program reporting 26 enrolled and 17 graduated, could not be attributed to a named institution with confidence.[24][25] When Solar for All went looking for installers in January 2026, it had to run an open expression-of-interest process to find qualified firms.[6] A program that succeeds in creating demand without building supply will produce queues, poor installations, and disappointed customers; Pillar 5 therefore treats workforce as infrastructure.
Where Grenada’s electricity came from, 2024
The price of diesel dependence moves with the oil market
Read together, the eight barriers describe a market that was first suppressed, then frozen, then left with unfinished rules, an unfair export price and unpriced storm risk. None of them requires new technology to fix. All of them are addressable by the regulator and government Grenada already has, which is precisely what the benchmarking in the next section shows comparable jurisdictions doing.
Section 3
International benchmarking: what actually moved rooftops
Five jurisdictions inform this design. Two are the program’s parents: Australia, which industrialised rooftop solar, and Canada, whose acceleration program design this paper adapts. Three are Caribbean peers facing the same sun, the same storms, and the same diesel bills, whose choices show what works at island scale and what Grenada should do differently.
| Market | Core mechanism | Result on the record | Lesson for Grenada |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia (SRES) | Deemed, upfront certificates for small systems, created at the point of sale and traded through a national clearing house; a national approved-product list; accredited installers; rules-based grid connection with dynamic export limits. | Rooftop solar became a mass market and soft costs, not hardware, became the battleground. The Canadian program design documented the same finding: process industrialisation, not subsidy size, is what separates cheap markets from expensive ones. | Adopt the machinery, not the subsidy level: a deemed, simple, point-of-sale incentive logic; one national equipment list; accreditation as the quality gate; grid rules published in advance. Grenada’s diesel-priced exports already give solar strong economics, so the certificate layer can be lighter than Australia’s and focused on financing rather than price support. |
| Canada (sister program) | The design set out in The Canadian Solar Acceleration Act: severable pillars, a certificate clearing facility, automated permitting and interconnection, national accreditation, and an explicit rule that the program funds rails, not cheques, with grandfathering of terms for systems once installed. | A design-stage program (2026) whose transferable content is architectural: standardisation of soft costs, incentive delivery through existing institutions, and honest treatment of winter and grid physics. | Copy the architecture, invert the physics. Canada’s constraint is winter darkness; Grenada’s is storm wind and a small grid’s absorption limit. The pillars map one to one, but Pillar 3 here is resilience, a pillar Canada did not need and Grenada cannot omit. |
| Barbados | A published feed-in tariff set by the Fair Trading Commission: 20-year fixed rates, differentiated by system size (2023 round: BBD$0.3425 to 0.3975 per kWh), with smaller systems on sale-of-excess and larger on buy-all/sell-all, and earlier Renewable Energy Rider customers grandfathered for 20 years. | By December 2020 Barbados had 49 MW of solar PV installed, 39 MW of it distributed, generating about 8 percent of consumption and saving an estimated US$9.22 million in foreign exchange that year, on a grid roughly three and a half times Grenada’s peak.[27][28] | A published, long-tenor, size-differentiated tariff with grandfathering is what drew distributed investment in the region. Proportionally, Barbados’s distributed fleet is equivalent to roughly 10 MW on Grenada’s grid, a realistic five-year ambition for the distributed layer alone. Barbados also now offers the caution: at higher penetrations it has run into grid-absorption and licensing constraints, widely reported regionally, which is why this program builds dynamic export management in from day one rather than retrofitting it. |
| Dominica | Geothermal first: publicly de-risked drilling, then a 10 MW plant at Laudat in the Roseau Valley under a 25-year build-own-operate power purchase agreement with Ormat, signed at COP28 in 2023, with construction from June 2024, about 90 percent complete by August 2025 and commercial operations targeted for March 2026.[29] | Dominica is roughly fifteen years ahead of Grenada on the same geothermal path and expects the plant to carry it toward 100 percent renewable electricity by 2030. | Geothermal is a decade-scale project even when it works. Grenada’s drilling timeline runs to 2028, implying plant operation in the early 2030s at best. Distributed solar is the only resource that can move Grenada’s renewable share this decade, and it should be designed to complement geothermal baseload when it arrives, not to compete with it (Section 5). |
| Jamaica and St Lucia | Jamaica: competitive utility-scale tenders, reaching 188 MW of renewable capacity by December 2024, about 10 percent of generation, toward a 50 percent by 2030 target, with roughly 100 MW of solar awarded in November 2024 alone. St Lucia: a utility-owned first plant (the 3 MW La Tourney farm, 2018, about 7 GWh a year) plus a simple residential net-metering window for 5 to 25 kW systems, now tendering 10 MW of solar with 13 MW of storage.[30][31] | Two different sequences: Jamaica scaled the utility layer first and left rooftops secondary; St Lucia paired one utility plant with an early, simple household window. | Grenada’s utility layer is already moving (MBIA, SSIPP, CEGEB rooftops). The missing layer is exactly the one St Lucia opened early and Jamaica deferred: a simple, published household and small-commercial framework. This program fills that gap rather than duplicating the utility tenders PURC already runs. |
The OECS frame
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Sustainable Energy Roadmap 2025 to 2035, adopted with the Basseterre Declaration in February 2025, sets a floor of 30 percent renewable penetration across the OECS by 2030, with a minimum of 20 percent in each member state, rising to 50 percent by 2035.[32] On Grenada’s recent generation volumes, meeting the 20 percent national floor implies roughly 15 to 18 MW of solar-equivalent capacity in service by 2030. The MBIA plant alone approaches that on capacity, but capacity concentrated in one plant does not deliver the bill relief, resilience, and local employment that distributed systems do, and the 2035 step to 50 percent cannot be met without a functioning rooftop market. This program is designed to be Grenada’s delivery vehicle for the OECS floor, and is framed as an input to the Integrated Resource and Resilience Plan (IRRP) now nearing finalisation, not a rival to it (Section 6).
Section 4
The five pillars
The pillars are severable, as in the Canadian design: each can proceed on its own legal and administrative footing, and the failure or delay of one does not strand the others. Pillars 1 and 2 are PURC instruments. Pillar 3 is a standards and resilience package shared between PURC, the Ministry of Climate Resilience, and Grenlec. Pillars 4 and 5 are delivery programs, built on Solar for All and TAMCC respectively.
Pillar 1
Fair export value: a net-billing framework that pays for power, not just fuel
PURC should set and publish a net-billing framework under which distributed generators are paid a cost-reflective export rate for electricity delivered to the grid. Cost-reflective means the rate is built from the value the exported kilowatt-hour actually creates: avoided fuel, avoided generation losses (system losses run about 7 percent), the capacity value of daytime generation on a cooling-driven system, and deferred network cost where PURC judges it real. It replaces the historical fuel-only buy-back of about EC$0.45 per kWh, which priced everything except fuel at zero.[14] The rate, its components and its review cycle should be published in a single PURC order, differentiated where PURC finds it justified by system size on the Barbados model, and netted against consumption on the customer’s ordinary bill.
Two design rules matter more than the starting number. First, grandfathering: the export terms in force when a system is interconnected are locked for a defined term, recommended at 10 years for systems under 10 kW and aligned to contract tenor for larger systems, so that a household’s investment case cannot be rewritten by a later tariff review. Barbados grandfathered its early customers for 20 years; the principle, not the exact tenor, is what made its market bankable.[28] Second, caps sized to purpose, not rationing: the commercial self-generation cap of 60 percent of nominal daily demand should be replaced by a sizing rule tied to the site’s daytime load and the feeder’s published hosting capacity (Pillar 2), with export beyond self-consumption welcomed and paid at the Pillar 1 rate rather than prohibited.
Pillar 2
Interconnection by default: rules, maps and deadlines
The draft Supply Code already contains the skeleton: small renewable facilities at or below 500 kW follow a simplified interconnection pathway, and larger facilities are treated as generation licensees with full conditions.[5] Pillar 2 asks PURC to finalise that Code and complete it with the three elements that turn a pathway into a default. Published hosting-capacity maps, feeder by feeder, updated on a stated cycle, so applicants and installers can see where capacity exists before they design. Standard agreements: one interconnection agreement and one net-billing contract for the simplified pathway, non-negotiable and published, replacing case-by-case drafting. Decision timelines: a complete application under the simplified pathway is approved, or refused with stated technical reasons, within a published number of business days, with silence escalating automatically to PURC rather than expiring in a queue.
Interconnection by default also means the technical requirements are knowable in advance: the smart-inverter functions and dynamic export settings specified in Section 5 should be published as a single schedule to the Supply Code, so that equipment bought anywhere in the region to that schedule connects anywhere in Grenada without bespoke engineering review.
Pillar 3
Resilience-grade standard: built for the storm, insured against it
Limlair is the controlling fact: a plant engineered to ASCE 7-10 at a 168 mph basic wind speed, a 1-in-1,700-year return period, was still severely damaged by Beryl weeks before completion.[12] The lesson is not that engineering fails; it is that Grenada’s standard must be written from Beryl’s evidence, not from generic Caribbean practice. Pillar 3 establishes a national resilience-grade standard for solar installations with four components.
- Mounting and engineering requirements for rooftop and ground-mount systems, drawing on the RMI and Clinton Foundation Solar Under Storm best practices already adopted into the Eastern Caribbean Building Code for ground-mount and extended to rooftop in Solar Under Storm II: individual module clamps, vibration-resistant fixings, no self-tapping screws in structural connections, and racking tested to Category 5 three-second gusts.[33] No Grenada-specific statutory wind-load standard for private rooftop PV was located in the research; this pillar creates it, as a schedule PURC and the planning authorities can both point to.
- A national equipment and installer standard: one approved-equipment list (modules, inverters, racking, batteries) aligned to the Pillar 2 interconnection schedule, and installation permitted only by installers on the Pillar 5 national register. Equipment on the list connects by default; equipment off the list carries the burden of proof.
- A spares and insurance facility: a program-level facility, designed with the development partners in Section 6, that holds critical spares (modules, inverters, racking) in country against storm damage, and that aggregates rooftop systems into an insurable pool, extending the parametric logic of Grenlec’s CCRIF cover, which paid US$9.32 million within 14 days of Beryl, down to the distributed layer where no priced insurance product was found to exist.[10] CEGEB’s own environmental framework already contemplates demountable structures and insurance for damaged assets; the facility generalises that thinking.[34]
- Critical-facility microgrids: hospitals, water plants, shelters, ports, and communications sites receive solar-plus-storage microgrids designed to island and run through an outage, on the template of the MBIA project’s resilient microgrid purpose and the post-Beryl undergrounding of the St George’s West feeder serving the General Hospital and the Carriacou West feeder serving the desalination plant.[7][10]
Carriacou and Petite Martinique are the flagship resilience zone. The 100 percent renewable commitment, the Limlair rebuild (about 800 kWp with battery storage, as NDC 3.0 describes the reconstruction), and the islands’ small, bounded grids make them the place where the full standard, storage pairing, microgrid design and insurance facility are proven together and published as the national template.[2][12]
Pillar 4
Money that reaches the roof: finance built on Solar for All
Solar for All has established the delivery channel: a ministry-run program offering 1 to 6 kW systems to households and small agro-processors, prioritising the vulnerable and energy-insecure.[6] Pillar 4 gives that channel a financial engine with three moving parts. A revolving fund, capitalised from concessional sources (Section 6), whose repayments recycle into new systems rather than returning to a consolidated fund, so early climate finance keeps working after its first deployment. On-bill financing, under which a household or business repays its system through a line on its Grenlec bill, sized so the combined bill and repayment sit below the pre-solar bill at the Pillar 1 export rate; the bill is the collection mechanism Grenada already trusts, and it travels with the meter if the property is sold. And climate finance alignment: program design mapped from the outset to the channels already open in Grenada, CEGEB’s IDA and Clean Technology Fund money, the World Bank’s RREIIF aggregation facility, CDB storage and geothermal windows, and Green Climate Fund access through the Grenada Development Bank as an accredited entity, so that each funding application describes a program that already exists rather than a proposal that might.[8][18][35]
One source of money is deliberately excluded from the load-bearing structure. Citizenship by Investment revenue was extraordinary in 2023, gross programme revenue of EC$1.13 billion, and the IMF credits prudent saving of CBI revenues with buffering the post-Beryl fiscal position. But application volumes then fell 81 percent in a single year, from 2,297 in 2023 to 420 in 2024, as a backlog cleared.[36][37] A program whose fifth year depends on CBI receipts is a program designed to be stranded. CBI revenue, when it flows, is welcome as acceleration capital, topping up the revolving fund in good years. The fund’s base case assumes none.
Pillar 5
People and productive use: the workforce, and solar that earns
A five-year scale-up on an island whose energy sector employs a few hundred people is, in large part, a training program. Pillar 5 anchors installer accreditation at TAMCC, building a dedicated solar PV qualification on its existing electrical installation diploma and aligning the credential to the Caribbean Vocational Qualification framework administered regionally through the Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (CCREEE), so a Grenadian installer’s ticket is recognised across the OECS and a regional workforce can surge into Grenada after a storm, as Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation (CARILEC) line crews already do.[10][24][25] PURC maintains a national register of accredited installers and certified systems; registration is the gateway to Pillar 2’s default interconnection, Pillar 3’s equipment list, and Pillar 4’s finance, which makes accreditation worth having and standards worth keeping, enforced by money and market access rather than by inspection alone.
The pillar’s second half is productive use: solar aimed at the loads where a kilowatt-hour earns money, not just saves it. Agro-processing, where Solar for All has already opened the door to small processors, and where Beryl’s damage ledger, agriculture losses of US$29 million, 62 percent of all losses nationally, marks the sector most exposed to climate risk.[6][22] Fisheries cold chain: ice and cold storage at landing sites, where solar-plus-storage substitutes for the diesel and grid dependence that spoil catch when power fails. Public buildings, where CEGEB’s retrofit and rooftop program provides an estimated 8 MW or more of demand and a visible public estate setting the standard.[2][8] Hotels, inside the commercial block that consumes about half of Grenada’s electricity, where the Pillar 1 cap reform finally lets a large roof be used at its full size.[38] The research found no published audit quantifying the energy loads of nutmeg and cocoa processing, rum distilleries or fisheries cold chain; the pillar therefore begins with a load audit of those sectors, conducted with the Grenada Co-operative Nutmeg Association, the cocoa association, the fisheries division and the hotel association, so that productive-use targeting rests on Grenadian numbers rather than imported assumptions.
Section 5
Technical and grid architecture for a small, isolated grid
Grenada’s grid has no interconnection to fall back on, a peak of 37.67 MW, a base load of about 20 MW, and 15 diesel generators totalling about 50 MW, many of them, on the World Bank’s account, within two to four years of the end of their economic life.[39][40][8] On a grid this size, the integration questions that large systems meet at 30 percent penetration arrive at 10 percent. The architecture below treats that as a design condition, not a surprise.
Integration limits arrive early, so manage exports dynamically from day one
When the MBIA plant (15.1 MWp) is generating at noon alongside a mature rooftop fleet, instantaneous solar output can approach or exceed midday demand on a mild day. The tools for this are standard and should be specified now, while the fleet is small: smart inverters with volt-watt and frequency-watt response as a condition of interconnection; dynamic operating envelopes, under which each connection receives a variable export limit reflecting real feeder conditions, with a guaranteed minimum export level so the customer’s Pillar 1 economics are never zeroed by the grid operator; and curtailment as a published last resort, with curtailed energy counted and reported, not silently absorbed. Barbados’s experience at higher penetration is the regional warning against bolting these controls on after the fleet is built.[28]
Storage is part of the solar design, not a separate program
The MBIA project sets the national template: 15.1 MWp of solar procured together with 10.6 MW / 21.2 MWh of storage, with Grenlec building the substation, lines and battery integration, and the airport supplied as a resilient microgrid.[7] The program generalises that pairing in three places: utility and SSIPP procurements sized with storage as PURC’s tenders now do; community and critical-facility systems under Pillar 3, where storage is what converts a solar array into a resilience asset; and behind-the-meter storage offered inside Pillar 4 finance, so households can shift midday surplus into the evening rather than exporting into a constrained feeder. A separate CDB-financed battery tender (5.5 MW / 11 MWh, bids due 23 October 2026) is also in the market; whether it overlaps with or adds to the MBIA battery is not clarified in published sources and should be confirmed by PURC so national storage accounting counts each megawatt-hour once.[41]
Geothermal is the baseload partner, not the competitor
Surface studies at Mt St Catherine support a 15 MW geothermal plant that could displace about 55 percent of diesel generation. CDB approved US$9.4 million in 2023 and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has pledged £10 million toward an expanded drilling campaign, deeper and directional wells rather than slim holes, now running to 2028, with a competitive tender for private construction and operation to follow if the resource proves out.[42] NDC 3.0 places a plant in operation “within the next decade.”[2] The planning logic in Grenada’s own documents is the correct one: geothermal baseload complemented by solar, wind, and storage. Solar-plus-storage serves the daytime and cooling load and the resilience mission now; geothermal, when it arrives, displaces the overnight and baseload diesel that solar cannot reach; storage arbitrages between the two. A system designed on that complementarity strands no asset: every rooftop installed under this program remains valuable in a geothermal future, because its output displaces the most expensive marginal fuel first and its battery remains a grid asset under any generation mix.
Rebuild the wires for the weather that exists
Beryl’s restoration took four months on the sister islands with mutual assistance from seven regional utilities.[23] The resilience program already under way, CCRIF-funded undergrounding of the hospital and desalination feeders among it, should be extended under this program’s Pillar 3 umbrella: feeder undergrounding prioritised by critical-load mapping, pole and conductor standards reviewed against Beryl’s failure record, and the hosting-capacity maps of Pillar 2 published jointly with resilience mapping, so that the feeders most able to host solar and the feeders most in need of hardening are planned as one network, not two.
Section 6
Finance and intergovernmental delivery: who pays for what
Grenada’s energy transition is priced by its own NDC at more than US$2 billion across mitigation and adaptation, conditional on international support.[2] This program is a small, defined slice of that total, and its financing plan starts from money and institutions that already exist rather than a new fiscal commitment.
| Party | Role in this program | Instruments already in place |
|---|---|---|
| Government of Grenada | Program owner. Holds the duty-waiver regime; capitalises the Pillar 4 revolving fund’s first tranche; delivers the public-building estate through CEGEB; carries the Carriacou and Petite Martinique flagship. | Full duty and tax waiver on renewable imports (6 percent customs service charge only); disaster-clause fiscal protection, first activated after Beryl.[2][9] |
| PURC | Regulatory engine: the Pillar 1 net-billing order, the final Supply Code and hosting-capacity maps of Pillar 2, the technical schedules of Pillar 3, the installer register of Pillar 5, and continued procurement of utility and SSIPP capacity. | Rate-setting, PPA approval and grid-access powers under the 2016 Acts; procurement-entity role exercised in the SSIPP and MBIA tenders.[2][4][7] |
| Grenlec | Network operator and counterparty: interconnection delivery to Pillar 2 timelines, on-bill repayment collection for Pillar 4, substation and battery integration on the MBIA template, feeder hardening and undergrounding. | Listed, majority state-owned utility; CCRIF parametric cover in force since 2023.[3][10] |
| World Bank | Anchor financier of the buildings and rooftop layer and of regional aggregation. | CEGEB: US$40 million IDA and US$8.5 million Clean Technology Fund loan for Grenada within a US$131.87 million regional project; RREIIF: US$110 million regional facility with the ECCB for Grenada, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines.[8][18] |
| Caribbean Development Bank | Geothermal and storage financier; natural partner for the Pillar 3 spares and insurance facility design. | US$9.4 million geothermal drilling (2023), with UK FCDO £10 million alongside; MBIA battery package of a US$3 million grant (UK FCDO and EU) plus a US$5.7 million loan from Canada under the SuRGE program.[41][42] |
| Green Climate Fund and bilateral partners | Grant and concessional windows for the resilience and household layers, channelled through accredited national institutions. | GCF Enhancing Direct Access facility operating through the Grenada Development Bank as an accredited entity; the G-CREWS precedent (€35.4 million GCF grant for water, with solar for pumping and treatment) as a working Grenadian delivery model; UAE-CREF’s US$3.5 million grant that built Limlair.[12][35] |
Sequencing with the IRRP
This paper is offered as an input to the Integrated Resource and Resilience Plan process, not a substitute for it. The IRRP is the statutory-grade planning exercise that will settle Grenada’s generation mix across solar, geothermal, wind, and storage to 2035 and beyond. The program’s claims on the IRRP are three, and they are modest: that the distributed layer be planned as a resource in its own right, with the rooftop potential IRENA’s SolarCity work quantified (30 MW across St George’s, Grand Anse, Grenville and Hillsborough, capable of meeting 28.5 percent of national demand) treated as a supply option alongside central plants;[43] that the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 regulatory instruments proceed on PURC’s own authority without waiting for the IRRP’s publication, since they are enabling rules rather than generation choices; and that the IRRP, when published, review the program’s targets and correct them in the open. A program that cannot survive contact with the national plan does not deserve to; this one is designed to be adopted by it.
The fiscal honesty paragraph
Two Grenadian fiscal facts discipline this design. First, the disaster clause works: after Beryl, Grenada deferred more than US$12.5 million on its US$112 million bond, plus about US$5 million across other loans, because the clause was written before it was needed.[9] Program finance should carry the same pre-agreed shock logic, with storm-year repayment pauses built into the revolving fund’s terms rather than improvised after landfall. Second, no executed Grenadian debt-for-climate swap was found in the research; such swaps exist in the region (Belize, Barbados, the Bahamas) and in Grenada’s own resource-mobilisation strategy as instruments to pursue, but they are not money in hand and this program does not count them.[44]
Section 7
Risks and mitigations
| Risk | Evidence | Mitigation in this design |
|---|---|---|
| A major hurricane destroys compliant arrays anyway | Limlair, engineered to 168 mph, was severely damaged by Beryl weeks before completion; Beryl’s total effects were 16.74 percent of GDP.[12][22] | Pillar 3 standard written from Beryl’s failure record; spares held in country; aggregated insurance pool on the CCRIF parametric model; demountable designs where CEGEB practice supports them; restoration targets set in weeks, with CARILEC-style mutual assistance extended to the distributed fleet through the Pillar 5 regional credential.[10][33][34] |
| Small-grid curtailment erodes the export promise | A 37.67 MW peak and 20 MW base leave limited room for unmanaged midday exports once MBIA and CEGEB capacity is in service; Barbados has met absorption constraints at higher penetration.[28][39] | Dynamic operating envelopes with a guaranteed minimum export from day one; storage pairing in procurement and in household finance; curtailment published and counted, so the Pillar 1 rate can be defended or adjusted on evidence. |
| Grenlec execution capacity | The utility must simultaneously replace ageing diesel units (it rented an additional 10 MW of temporary capacity in 2025), integrate MBIA, harden feeders and run interconnection at program pace, with fuel-recovery swings of EC$16 million a year stressing its balance sheet.[17][40] | Pillar 2 timelines escalate to PURC rather than relying on goodwill; standard, non-negotiable agreements minimise per-connection engineering; program reporting publishes interconnection performance, so capacity problems surface early and can be resourced, including through RREIIF and CEGEB technical assistance.[18] |
| Land scarcity constrains ground-mount growth | Grenada is 344 km², volcanic and mountainous, about half forested; Grenlec itself cites the difficulty of securing suitable land as the reason for its multi-site rooftop strategy.[21][45] | Rooftop-first by design: IRENA’s SolarCity assessment finds 30 MW of rooftop potential in four towns alone, meeting 28.5 percent of demand, before any agricultural land is touched; ground-mount reserved for screened sites such as the airport lands; the two 1 MW floating solar projects on irrigation ponds in NDC 3.0 point to water surfaces as a further land-sparing option.[2][43] |
| Finance volatility: CBI and donor cycles | CBI applications fell 81 percent in one year; donor facilities are regional and competitive.[36] | CBI excluded from the base case (Pillar 4); the revolving fund recycles repayments so the program’s run-rate does not depend on annual appropriations or application rounds; multiple financier channels mapped in Section 6 so no single facility is load-bearing. |
| Regulatory drift: the unfinished framework stays unfinished | The Supply Code remained in draft in 2026, a decade after the Act; the interim tariff methodology has awaited resolution since 2022; the SSIPP pilot took three years to license 850 kW.[5][16][17] | The pillars are severable and sequenced so the two PURC instruments (Pillars 1 and 2) are single decisions with published drafts already in existence; the roadmap (Section 8) dates them in the first twelve months, while political attention from the Beryl recovery and the IRRP process is highest. |
| Geothermal disappoints or slips beyond 2028 | Exploration drilling is inherently uncertain; the campaign has already been redesigned once (deeper, directional wells) and its timeline extended to 2028.[42] | The program does not depend on geothermal for its five-year targets; solar and storage carry the decade. If geothermal proves out early, Section 5’s complementarity design means the distributed fleet remains an asset, not a stranded cost. |
| Workforce bottleneck converts demand into queues | No dedicated solar qualification at TAMCC; a thin installer bench that Solar for All had to discover through open competition.[6][25] | Pillar 5 sequences accreditation ahead of the finance scale-up in the roadmap; the register-and-gateway design makes accreditation the route to the work, pulling trainees through; regional CVQ recognition allows supervised surge capacity from OECS partners. |
Section 8
Roadmap: twelve months and five years
First twelve months: make the rules, prove the standard
- Audited baseline. PURC and Grenlec publish a single installed-capacity baseline from the interconnection registry and licensing records, resolving the 4 to 6.4 MW discrepancy, and the program’s targets are restated against it.
- Pillar 1 order. PURC publishes its avoided-cost calculation and issues the net-billing order: cost-reflective export rate, published components, grandfathering term, and replacement of the commercial 60 percent sizing cap with the load-and-hosting-capacity rule.
- Pillar 2 completion. The Supply Code is finalised; hosting-capacity maps for the first feeders are published; standard interconnection and net-billing agreements and decision timelines take effect for the simplified pathway at or below 500 kW.
- Pillar 3 standard. The resilience-grade mounting, equipment, and installation standard is adopted as a PURC schedule, drawn from Solar Under Storm practice; the spares and insurance facility is designed with CDB and CCRIF input and costed for the year-two budget.
- Flagship start. The Limlair rebuild proceeds as the first resilience-zone project under the new standard, with its design and post-storm inspection regime published as the national template.
- Pillars 4 and 5 foundations. The revolving fund is capitalised and the on-bill agreement signed, with Solar for All as its first delivery channel; TAMCC’s solar PV qualification is approved and its first cohort enrolled; the sector load audit (nutmeg, cocoa, fisheries, hotels) is commissioned.
- IRRP lodgement. The program is formally lodged as an IRRP input, with the rooftop resource (30 MW, four towns) tabled as a supply option.[43]
Years two to five: scale the distributed layer
- Distributed capacity. Rooftop and small-commercial installations scale toward the Barbados-proportional benchmark of roughly 10 MW of distributed capacity, additional to the utility layer (MBIA 15.1 MWp, CEGEB public buildings at an estimated 8 MW or more, SSIPP rounds), carrying Grenada past the OECS 20 percent national floor for 2030 and building the base for the 50 percent 2035 step.[2][7][28][32]
- Resilience zone completion. Carriacou and Petite Martinique reach their 100 percent renewable electricity commitment, with the full standard, storage and microgrid architecture in service and independently reviewed after the first major storm exposure.
- Critical facilities. Hospitals, water, shelters, ports, and communications sites operate as islandable microgrids; feeder undergrounding extends by critical-load priority.
- Productive use. Agro-processing, fisheries cold chain, and hotel installations proceed from the year-one load audit, financed through the revolving fund at commercial windows distinct from the household window.
- Workforce maturity. The national register carries the installer base the program’s installation rate requires; TAMCC graduates supply it; regional CVQ recognition is exercised in at least one mutual-assistance deployment.
- Geothermal readiness. As drilling results firm up toward and beyond 2028, the IRRP’s solar-storage-geothermal dispatch design is settled with the distributed fleet inside it, and the export-rate framework is reviewed, grandfathered systems untouched, against the new marginal-cost reality.
Targets in this roadmap are stated against the sources cited and are subject to restatement once the audited baseline (month one to twelve) and the final IRRP are published. Where this paper and the IRRP differ, the IRRP governs; the program’s regulatory instruments stand on PURC’s own authority in the meantime.
Appendix A
Diesel-displacement economics per megawatt installed
All inputs below are taken from the cited Grenadian sources; no external price assumptions are introduced. The Limlair project is the anchor because it is the only Grenadian solar project with published yield and fuel-saving figures.
| Quantity | Per 1 MWp installed | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Annual generation | 1,828 MWh | Limlair projection: 1,565 MWh per year from 856 kWp, about 1,828 kWh per kWp per year.[12] |
| Diesel displaced, project basis | about 97,500 gallons (about 369,000 litres) per year | Limlair was projected to save more than 83,500 gallons (about 316,081 litres) of diesel per year at 856 kWp; scaled linearly to 1 MWp.[12] |
| Diesel displaced, efficiency cross-check | about 98,200 imperial gallons per year | Grenlec’s reported fuel efficiency of 18.61 kWh per imperial gallon (nine months to September 2024) applied to 1,828 MWh. The two independent routes agree within about 1 percent.[17] |
| Fuel-cost saving, Carriacou basis | about US$533,000 per year | Limlair’s projected saving of about US$38,000 per month (US$456,000 per year) at 856 kWp, scaled to 1 MWp. This reflects Carriacou diesel generation costs; mainland figures will differ and should be restated from Grenlec’s mainland fuel accounts before use in a tariff filing.[12] |
| Share of Carriacou diesel generation offset | 15 to 20 percent per 0.856 MWp | Limlair was projected to offset 15 to 20 percent of Carriacou’s diesel generation. Carriacou’s current peak is not published in the sources; the dated figure is about 1.3 MW (2016).[12][14] |
| Value of a self-consumed kWh to the customer | EC$0.97 to 1.02 per kWh avoided purchase | Average realised tariff, EC$0.97 per kWh in the first half of 2025 and EC$1.02 in June 2024. This is why self-consumption, not export, carries the household investment case today, and why the Pillar 1 export rate determines how much larger systems can grow beyond self-consumption sizing.[26] |
| System context | 1 MW is 2.7 percent of system peak | Peak demand 37.67 MW. PURC’s chief executive has put annual fuel spend for the diesel fleet at more than EC$150 million; the original report does not specify the currency unambiguously, and the figure is used here only as an order of magnitude for the national fuel bill that each installed megawatt reduces.[16][39] |
What this appendix does not do: it does not state an installed cost per watt for Grenada, because no Grenada-specific installed-cost series was located in the research, and importing Australian or Canadian cost figures into Grenadian conditions (freight, hurricane-grade mounting, small-project overheads) would misstate the case. Establishing a published Grenadian cost benchmark, from Solar for All and SSIPP delivery data, is a year-one task under Section 8.
References
Sources
Every load-bearing figure in this paper is drawn from the sources below, researched 18 October 2026. Where sources conflict, the paper says so in the text and uses the range. Items the research could not verify, including any current PURC avoided-cost figure, a published net-billing tariff in force, and the final IRRP, are flagged as open questions where they arise rather than filled by inference.
- [1]Global Energy Monitor, Energy profile: Grenada (generation mix and capacity shares, 2024, citing IRENA and Ember data). gem.wiki/Energy_profile:_Grenada
- [2]Government of Grenada, Ministry of Climate Resilience, Grenada’s Third Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0), October 2025. climateresilience.gov.gd
- [3]Government Information Service, Grenada, press release on the repurchase of Grenlec shares, 29 December 2020; corroborated by CARICOM Business. ecseonline.com · caricom.org
- [4]Electricity Supply Act No. 19 of 2016; Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act No. 20 of 2016; PURC (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2025, via InforMEA legislative records. informea.org
- [5]Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, Grenada, Draft Supply Code (posted March 2026; simplified interconnection at or below 500 kW, self-generator permits, registry). purc.gd
- [6]pv-magazine, “Grenada seeks installers for Solar for All program,” 22 January 2026. pv-magazine.com
- [7]pv-magazine, “Grenada launches 15.1 MW utility-scale PV tender,” 19 November 2024; Grenlec, PURC and RMI memorandum release, March 2025. pv-magazine.com · grenlec.com
- [8]World Bank, “Caribbean Countries Move Toward Energy Sustainability with New Regional Project” (CEGEB approval, US$131.87 million regional; US$40 million IDA and US$8.5 million Clean Technology Fund loan for Grenada), 4 March 2025. worldbank.org
- [9]Reuters, reported via Claims Journal, “Grenada first to activate hurricane clause” (deferral of more than US$12.5 million on the US$112 million bond), 20 August 2024. claimsjournal.com
- [10]CCRIF SPC, Grenlec payout release (US$9,323,275) and post-Beryl payout-use synopsis (undergrounding of the St George’s West and Carriacou West feeders). ccrif.org · ccrif.org
- [11]Solar resource: Global Energy Monitor and NREL data (global horizontal irradiation above 5 kWh/m²/day); National Energy Policy annex range of 5 to 6 kWh/m²/day, via the OAS. gem.wiki · oas.org
- [12]Ministry of Climate Resilience portal, Limlair Solar PV Hybrid Project, Carriacou (856 kWp; 1,565 MWh per year projected; 168 mph design wind speed; UAE-CREF US$3.5 million; Beryl damage). climateresilience.gov.gd
- [13]Installed solar stock, conflicting sources: NDC 3.0 (about 6.2 MW PV operational, end-2024) [2]; IRENA workshop reporting (about 6.4 MW renewable capacity, 5.3 MW self-generation, November 2025); IRENA statistics via pv-magazine (4 MW cumulative solar, January 2026) [6]; PURC tender background (1.1 MW utility plus 3.5 MW customer-owned, November 2024) [7].
- [14]Business Grenada, Issue 7 (2016 to 2017): historical customer renewable buy-back of about EC$0.45 per kWh against a retail price of about EC$1.08 per kWh; Carriacou peak of about 1.3 MW (2016). joomag.com
- [15]Grenlec Customer Interconnection Programme history (tranches of 500 to 800 kW; systems up to 100 kW), via WRB Enterprises. wrbenterprises.com
- [16]Caribbean Times / Caribbean Media Corporation, PURC grants licences to Small-Scale Independent Power Producers (SSIPP pilot, roughly 850 kW; PURC chief executive statements on framework timelines and annual fuel spend above EC$150 million, currency as reported). caribbeantimes.com
- [17]Grenlec filings to the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission: 2022 annual reporting (Interim Tariff Methodology pending; fuel recovery swings), September 2024 filing (system losses 7.05 percent; fuel efficiency 18.61 kWh per imperial gallon), June 2025 filing. ecsrc.com · ecseonline.com
- [18]World Bank, “Caribbean Countries Strengthen Energy Resilience via New Facility” (US$110 million Regional Renewable Energy and Infrastructure Investment Facility), 17 April 2025. worldbank.org
- [19]Global Energy Monitor, Grenada profile, on the pre-2020 period: restrictive utility policies and the missed 20 percent renewable goal for 2020. gem.wiki
- [20]GIZ, Reform of the Electricity Sector to Support Climate Policy in Grenada (market entry blocked under the monopoly legal structure). giz.de
- [21]Grenlec, “Addressing the challenges and options for renewable energy” (investment stalled by post-2016 regulatory uncertainty; 2.36 MWp combined utility and customer capacity; land constraints and the multi-site rooftop strategy). grenlec.com
- [22]Government of Grenada and UNDP, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, Hurricane Beryl (March 2025): total effects EC$595.16 million (16.74 percent of 2023 GDP); energy damage US$4.77 million and losses US$2.56 million; agriculture losses US$29 million. undp.org
- [23]Grenlec, 2024 Year in Review (19,318 customers offline; 100 percent of Carriacou and Petite Martinique customers; restoration completed end-October 2024 with CARILEC mutual assistance). grenlec.com
- [24]CCREEE, Grenada Energy Report Card 2020 (energy-sector employment of 346 persons, 2019; CVQ solar cohort of 26 enrolled and 17 graduated, institution not clearly rendered in the source). ccreee.org
- [25]T.A. Marryshow Community College, programme listings (Technical Diploma in Electrical Installation; AAS Electronics Technology; no dedicated solar PV programme located). tamcc.edu.gd
- [26]Grenlec ECSRC filings on realised tariffs: average rate EC$1.18 per kWh (December 2023), EC$1.02 (June 2024), EC$0.97 average (first half of 2025); non-fuel charges unchanged since 2016 (domestic EC$0.4057, commercial EC$0.4375). Grenlec non-fuel rate notice, September 2022. ecseonline.com · grenlec.com
- [27]Government of Barbados, Ministerial Statement on renewable energy (49 MW solar PV installed by December 2020, 39 MW distributed; 68 GWh; US$9.22 million foreign exchange saved). barbados parliamentary papers
- [28]Barbados Fair Trading Commission, feed-in tariff decisions (20-year terms; 2023 solar rates of BBD$0.3425 to 0.3975 per kWh by size band; grandfathering of Renewable Energy Rider customers). Post-2023 grid-absorption constraints are widely reported regionally and were not verified against a primary FTC source in this research. ftc.gov.bb · internationalbusiness.gov.bb
- [29]ThinkGeoEnergy, Dominica geothermal plant commissioning reporting (10 MW, Roseau Valley; Ormat 25-year build-own-operate PPA; construction from June 2024; commercial operations targeted March 2026). thinkgeoenergy.com
- [30]Jamaica Information Service, progress toward the 50 percent renewable target (188 MW renewable capacity by December 2024; about 100 MW solar awarded November 2024). jis.gov.jm
- [31]RMI, “Saint Lucia Solar Park Opens” (3 MW La Tourney, 2018, about 7 GWh per year); Energy for Growth Hub snapshot of St Lucia’s electricity sector (residential net metering, 5 to 25 kW), April 2026. rmi.org · energyforgrowth.org
- [32]OECS Commission, Sustainable Energy Roadmap 2025 to 2035 and Basseterre Declaration releases (30 percent renewable penetration by 2030, minimum 20 percent per member state; 50 percent by 2035), February 2025. pressroom.oecs.int
- [33]RMI and Clinton Foundation, Solar Under Storm best-practice guidance for hurricane-prone regions, as adopted into the Eastern Caribbean Building Code, and Solar Under Storm II rooftop guidance. environmentenergyleader.com
- [34]CEGEB Environmental and Social Management Framework (storm securing and demountable structures; insurance for damaged assets), October 2025. climateresilience.gov.gd
- [35]Green Climate Fund, G-CREWS project page (€35.357 million grant; water sector, including renewable energy for pumping and treatment); GCF Enhancing Direct Access, Eastern Caribbean, via the Grenada Development Bank as accredited entity. greenclimate.fund
- [36]IMI Daily, compilation of Investment Migration Agency data (gross CBI programme revenue of EC$1,129 million in 2023; applications down 81 percent, 2,297 in 2023 to 420 in 2024). Gross programme revenue includes amounts due to approved-project developers; the government share is smaller. imidaily.com
- [37]International Monetary Fund, Grenada 2024 Article IV Consultation (January 2025): Beryl damage of about 16 percent of GDP; CBI revenue savings as a post-Beryl buffer. imf.org
- [38]NREL, Island Energy Snapshot: Grenada (consumption by sector: residential 34.81 percent; small commercial 49.23 percent; large commercial 3.0 percent; street lighting 2.35 percent; c.2015, the most recent sector split located). nrel.gov
- [39]PURC tender documentation as reported by pv-magazine (system peak demand 37.67 MW; 15 diesel generators totalling 50 MW; utility PV 1.1 MW and customer-owned 3.5 MW), November 2024 [7]. Base load of about 20 MW: CCREEE Energy Report Card 2020 [24].
- [40]Grenlec ECSRC filing, period ended 30 June 2025 (additional 10 MW of rented temporary capacity; new engine procurement). ecseonline.com
- [41]Caribbean Development Bank, MBIA battery investment release (US$3 million grant from UK FCDO and the EU; US$5.7 million SuRGE loan from Canada); Grenlec tender for 5.5 MW / 11 MWh of battery storage, bids due 23 October 2026, as reported by Energía Estratégica. Whether this battery overlaps with or adds to the MBIA project’s 10.6 MW / 21.2 MWh is not clarified in the sources. caribank.org
- [42]Caribbean Development Bank, Grenada geothermal programme releases (Mt St Catherine; 15 MW indicated; about 55 percent diesel displacement; US$9.4 million approved 2023; UK FCDO £10 million; drilling timeline to 2028); ThinkGeoEnergy reporting on the expanded drilling campaign. caribank.org · thinkgeoenergy.com
- [43]IRENA SolarCity Simulator assessment for St George’s, Grand Anse, Grenville and Hillsborough (30 MW of rooftop PV capable of meeting 28.5 percent of national electricity demand), as reported in IRENA workshop materials, November 2025.
- [44]Commonwealth Secretariat, “Mobilising climate finance for NDCs: lessons from Grenada’s resource mobilisation strategy” (debt-for-climate swaps and green instruments listed as instruments to pursue; no executed Grenadian swap located). thecommonwealth.org
- [45]Land area and use: Grenada 344 km² (main island 311, Carriacou 30.7, Petite Martinique 2.3); forest about 50 percent; agricultural land 32.3 percent (CIA World Factbook estimates, 2011 land-use data, via secondary compilation). Dated; used for scale only.
Research compiled 18 October 2026 from the sources above. Figures are as published by their sources on that date; tenders described as in progress (the MBIA IPP award and the CDB battery tender) may have advanced since.